[iS6x-

and the front of Washington, under General Wadsworth, some 18,000, *include of the batteries under instruction*.[11] This was about half the number which we have seen was required. There is, therefore, no question that McClellan did not obey the orders[2] of the President, to leave in and about Washington such a force as in the opinion of the corps-commanders would render the city entirely secure; for this service 35,000 men at least, were, as we have seen, required.

McClellan has sought to justify his action in this matter by urging that he left at Manassas and Warrenton and in the Shenandoah Valley a large force, a part of which certainly ought to be counted in among the troops available for the defence of the Capital This, however, if true, is an admission that he did not do what he was directed to do, but, instead thereof, endeavored to compass the end aimed at by the President's order by doing something else than that which he was directed to do. It is, therefore; no justification for his action. Nevertheless, let us look at his dispositions.

His first plan was to open the Manasaas Gap railroad from Manassas to Strasburg in the Shenandoah Valley. He intended that Banks's headquarters should be at Manassas, that the railroad should be

repaired, and fortified at the river-crossings, and a permanent work erected at Strasburg. He was, however, obliged, about the middle of March, to re-

[1] 5 W. R,, 61. The italics are ours. This sentence shown how Wadsworth's nominal force was eked out.
* /<f., 50 ; order of March 8, 1862,